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Reading McCaffery: A discussion of Seven Pages Missing, Vol. 1 
Christine Stewart and Ted Byrne (2002) 
 
 
 
Christine – What does McCaffery mean by a “post-semiotic poem”? See the back cover of 
Seven Pages Missing: “The poem beyond semiosis is finally beyond reference, beyond the 
conditions that make the usual meaning of ‘meaning’ possible.” 
 
What is the “usual” meaning of meaning? 
 
What Roland Barthes, in The Pleasure of the Text, calls “the corporeal exteriorization of 
discourse,” is when the text does not attempt to express a clear message or a “theatre of 
emotions.” This provokes what he calls “pulsional incidents”. These are linguistic 
occasions where language points to the thick skin of its own materiality; that is to its sonic, 
and rhythmic qualities. Barthes refers to this as “writing aloud” (66). In writing aloud the 
text works to evoke “the grain of the throat, the patina of consonants, the voluptuousness of 
the vowels, a whole carnal stereophony.” This writing aloud manifests what Julia Kristeva 
refers to as the semiotic aspects of language. This includes its rhythmic qualities, its 
contradictions, meaninglessness, disruptions, silence and absence. According to Kristeva, 
poetic language is writing that illuminates the material qualities of language and its 
expressions.  The material aspects of language – tone, rhythm etc. – are its semiotic 
aspects. These aspects are irrepressible and work to destabilize the symbolic signifying 
process. This gives them their disruptive, even revolutionary potential. 
 
For Kristeva the semiotic aspects of language are the manifestations of the instinctual, 
unconscious drives of the irrepressible pre- and anti-symbolic body. Kristeva’s le 
sémiotique refers to the organization within the body of its instinctual drives as they affect 
language and its practices (see Leon Roudiez’ Introduction to Desire in Language). This is 
also true for Barthes. In The Pleasure of the Text the stereophonic quality of the text is 
opposed to the symbolic process of signification. That is, the semiotic is opposed to 
language and meaning. This notion of “meaning” is what Derrida calls the classical idea of 
meaning – the idea is that it is possible to affix a stable meaning in a particular linguistic 
configuration. 
 
My question is this: Is this McCaffery’s take? And if so, what of such distinctions between 
the symbolic and the semiotic, between meaning and the materiality of language? 
 
While Barthes and Kristeva (and maybe McCaffery) hold the carnal, the semiotic separate 
from the symbolic or meaning function of language, I don’t think that this is how 
McCaffery’s stuff works – when it works. The poetic function of language is to materialize 
meaning and its symbolic function – McCaffery refers to this as post-semiotic. But does this 
make for a poem that is beyond semiosis, beyond reference, “beyond the conditions that 
make the usual meaning of ‘meaning’ possible”? 
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Why should poetry be beyond reference, or the usual conditions of meaning? Why would 
the materialization of its poetic function make it beyond reference? What else can a poem 
be but in the midst of, pointing to, the very crazy mechanics of, the aurally swollen place of, 
and bursting with, the usual conditions of meaning? 
 
Ted – Aren’t you, in this last question, undoing the temporalizing and spacializing that 
allows conclusions to be arrived at? The trajectory of these opening remarks moves from a 
thinking that wants to structure everything – even within a post structuralist orientation – 
through a series of rejections, negations even, to a resituating of writing within a kind of a-
temporal, undifferentiated materiality, corporeality. In effect, aren’t you demonstrating an 
irrelevance of such terminology as “beyond reference” or “beyond the usual meaning of 
meaning”? From where you want to speak, these terms are meaningless. And I’m with you. 
But then I think, be careful because it’ll just come back to bite you in the ass (the dialectic). 
  
A tendency to coincide with the logic of this moving and heterogeneous chora 
finally forecloses the thetic. Mais alors, it’s the heterogeneous itself that is lost, and 
in its place is displayed the fantasme of identification with the feminine (maternal) 
body, if not the mutism of the paralyzed schizo!  
(Kristeva, La révolution du langage poétique 163, my translation, 
exclamation mark added) 
 
C – I think that Vico would say that it is all fantasmic identification with the body and that 
mutism is the place out of which comes the first gesture that signals that identification. The 
mind is a metaphor of the body. A metaphor is the mind thinking itself. So then what would 
be a dialectic in this case? Is the idea of a dialectic Cartesian? If everything we read is 
caught up in a Cartesian, Hegelian, Heideggerian, Derridian network how can we ever 
“speak” “outside”? For Vico, there is no outside. It’s all human: inside and out. But there is 
extension. And maybe we can re-inscribe the word “outside” into what [Susan] Howe calls 
“antinomial traces”. Most writing inside any outside got burned at the stake or sent off to the 
wilderness of margins. Isn’t the idea of the unconscious itself, as separate from 
consciousness, part of this split imposed by thinkers like Descartes, like even Plato, and then 
driven home by Freud? Vico seems to be proposing something “else” through his idea of 
topos and metaphorizing as an active extension of space, which is interesting. And yet 
elsewhere we are caught up in these terms and words and definitions that don’t allow us to 
go anywhere else.  But what if outsides are all we have; what if all we have is surface. And 
what about Agamben’s halo: “its beatitude is that of a potentiality that comes only after the 
act, of matter that does not remain beneath the form, but surrounds it with a halo” (The 
Coming Community)? But a halo is not a surface except perhaps as a ripple. 
 
I was talking to Lissa [Wolsak] about Vico this week and his idea of the origin of language 
and human society: In this case, Vico means the origin of Gentile society. The Gentiles, 
according to Vico were twice fallen, doubly lapsed, because of how badly Noah’s family 
behaved after the flood. The Jewish people, on the other hand, retained their composure and 
their relationship to God and thus to the truth of the world, words etc. The story (and it’s an 
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odd one) goes like this: After the flood, Noah’s sons and daughters (the son’s wives) got 
quickly off the boat. They were tired of rules and Fathers (as Vico says). On land, they went 
wild: had random sex and crapped anywhere they wanted. Babies were born, weaned young 
and left to wallow in their own shit. Instead of dying the neglected babies flourished. 
Fertilized by their own excrement, they transformed into gorgeous giants. The shit from 
these giants fertilized the forests and the fields. The giants never bathed and so thrived on 
the nutrients of their own feces. The trees grew so vast and tangled (from all the 
fertilization) that the giants had to sweat and strain to push their way through the forests. 
The nitrous salts from their giant sweaty armpits fell on the earth and made everything grow 
again (and again). Extreme fecundity, everything lush and thick. The huge forests, the 
massive giants sweaty, shitty, pushing, shouting. And these big dirty bodies existed in direct 
sensuous contact with the world. Each sensation occurred and then replaced the next. There 
was no memory, no mind, no bank.  
 
After 300 hundred years, the earth finally dried and the air dried. Lightening ignited in the 
exhalations of air, and when it struck, the giants were afraid for the first time. It was a fear 
that could not be acted on—there was nothing to fight or to eat. The thunder only signaled 
the passing of lightening. It signaled an absence. There was nothing the giants could do. 
And so, they paused—the thunder brought about a moment of reflection in the giants’ 
previous life of ceaseless sensation. Time occurred – diachronic and synchronic. Time was 
mind and from mind the first thought came. The first thought was a metaphor, an extension 
of the giant mind into, up against, entangled with the material world. In this extension, the 
giants perceived themselves as Other. The sky was body; the thunder was voice. And the 
body was called Jove. In the moment of the first thought, the giants ended and the human 
emerged. In awe of the big sky body other, the just post-giant new-human began to bathe in 
ritual ablutions. As they bathed they began to shrink in body (no more fertilization). As they 
continued to think up the world, their minds expanded and their heads grew—humans 
emerged (big heads, little bodies). These were the first humans. They made up the first 
human society that had to get along without God (due to the random sex and shitting). These 
humans no longer had access to God’s truth. They had to make up their own. Thus, 
metaphoric language, poetry: the language of necessity. According to Vico, this story 
demonstrates that all that humans can ever know is the real that humans make – verum 
factum. Vico wasn’t interested in proving what is or isn’t. He was interested in the fact that 
anything is, that there is an is. If you see. 
  
I don’t think that Lissa was very impressed. But I think Vico makes some pretty interesting 
observations about language and about what constitutes a subject, a society, a world. He is 
touted as a great humanist. His ideas about origins and etymologies have turned all sorts of 
different people on (Adolph Hitler, Harold Bloom, Hayden White, Hazard Adams, Northrop 
Frye, Edward Said, James Joyce, Karl Marx). But he isn’t a humanist or into origin unless 
you carefully unpack the terms. You could use Benjamin’s notion of origin—the idea of 
origin as memory or recognition. According to Vico, poetry is the language of necessity 
because poetic language is the illustration of our collective memories, our beginnings.  In 
poetry, humans make up a world to make up for the one we lost. All that we know – science, 
philosophy etc. – is based on our poetic, metaphoric, metonymic understanding of the 
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world. If we look at our metaphors (fables in brief – Vico calls them), we see the world, we 
see ourselves and how we have constructed the whole thing. 
 
Maybe the term beyond reference is more ur than I’d rather. 
 
T – Maybe, instead of saying that the “post-semiotic” poem is beyond reference, you could 
say that McCaffery writes poetry that is sometimes beyond the anxiety of the usual 
conditions of meaning – that is, it no longer clings to the illusion of language’s seamless 
capacities for signification. But, no. That isn’t quite right. Maybe McCaffery sometimes 
writes poetry that can encompass the anxiety, of the ache, of the nostalgia on which all 
“usual meaning” turns. This encompassing alters that turning. In fact (in words) that very 
turning is both released and displayed so that language articulates that meaning, is fully, 
complexly visible; even beautiful – or not; but, no longer consuming; no longer consumed 
by the sordid dream of absolute signification. 
 
provide the context and the content will follow 
(McCaffery, Seven Pages Missing 224) 
 
C – Isn’t this the form that is meaning? Language returned to language. I think Agamben 
says that. Language looking at itself. This is Lisa [Robertson]’s Perspex, no? That is, 
meaning forming by highlighting, making transparent the processes by which meaning is 
forming. That is, the same mortality that affixes itself to the semiotic, the materiality of 
language – its tone, its rhyme, its rhythm, its line and play – is ascribed to the meaning. 
Meaning is literal: mechanical, contextual, material, mortal, constructive and destructive 
procedures. These procedures contain their own necessary mortalities; and when these 
mortalities are placed in full view, the theatre that is meaning, that is language, is exposed 
(naked) – always consensual, catastrophic, formulating, residual, always graphemic, often 
strident, always rupturing, ruptured, posturing, disembodied and always syphilitic – riddled 
with rapid, suppurating and necessary (because it restores) decay. 
 
not a cuckoo 
but casting a throat 
into other bird songs 
               (144) 
  
For Barthes and Kristeva, the body and its unconscious drives work on language. Is this 
true for McCaffery? That is, does he see language as affected by the unconscious drives of 
our instinctual desires – a conduit through which the basic battles of our psychologies are 
played out? 
 
What if language is the conscious and unconscious drive of our instinctual desires? What if 
language is a site wherein the materiality of the sign does not simply haunt and disrupt the 
signification process? What if the materiality of language is the signification process, is the 
symbolic energy of language, the locus of desire? Just as form has poetic meaning, 
meaning has poetic and material form? If the articulation of the body is located in the 
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sensual and erotic materiality of the word, then why aren’t the lexical and symbolic 
elements of language? To write out loud and highlight the materiality of the sign is to 
highlight the materiality, and the machinations of the process of symbolic signification and 
so to materialize the signifier and the signified in such a way as to bring to bear upon it the 
histories that have brought it to its present signifying postures. 
 
While Kristeva writes about the semiotic in language or about how le sémiotique affects 
language and its practice, can’t poetry work language as always already le sémiotique – an 
always already material forming life form? 
 
Instead of putting his life into his novel . . . he made of his very life 
a work for which his own book was the model . . . 
  (Barthes on Proust, Image Music Text 144) 
 
Or have I got it all wrong? Is that already what he is saying, doing. Sometimes the stuff 
feels like a full blown unblown nostalgia: 
 
the soft mushy parts. Wet stone melting stone broken stone 
running body stone gland stone erect. Stone secret musics done. 
Granite hard round viscous parts. Not the whole. Never the whole. 
It can’t be the whole.               
(McCaffery Seven Pages 261) 
 
Why should it ever be whole? Or beyond reference for that matter. For that matter which it 
is – and it is most usual. 
 
Re: your lyric interests, did you read pages 184 – 197 (“from In England Now That 
Spring”)? I like this and do not suspect its ur yearnings. 
 
T – I don’t know. I’m still trying to teach myself to read this writing, and it’s not easy. I’m 
always fascinated by that which has the appearance of literature but undermines its 
precepts. Or that which undermines even the text that conceives of itself as literary. This is 
what I meant by “lyric”. Not that the instances you point to are lyric (the selection from 
Intimate Distortions would be another example), but that they still derive something from 
appearing to be so. Like, take, “a drawing”, on page 109, another translation exercise, is 
lovely as lyric, holds the effect of lyric, as fetish of meaning and subjectivity (Kristeva), as 
ideologeme, but is really even more to the side of lyric than the Stein source text. It doesn’t 
make sense. 
 
It wants to make something other than sense. Is this wanting described by the term “post-
semiotic”? I don’t know. He makes the point that he came by the term “semiotic” in the 
sixties from [Charles Sanders] Peirce via those Brazilian concrete poets (434). And the 
wanting is said to already be for a text that liberates from the word and shifts control from 
the writer to the reader. 
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C – Re: Lyric. This is something that I’ve also been thinking about. McCaffery is adept at 
creating and manipulating (splicing, giving/withdrawing) a kind of ‘master’ code of 
POETRY. What you could call the lyric or the conception of that which is literary. And I 
wonder, about that, as you say, “deriving something from appearing to be.” What is that 
derivation. Is it emotional and is it fair? Is it him showing us what he thinks we think we 
want and then withholding it? 
 
I don’t think that was something that Stein was interested in at all. 
 
Partly McCaffery’s ‘manipulation’ reveals the mechanics of the machine of lyric poetry 
(its traditions, assumptions etc.) and exposes to the reading reader the extent and intensity 
of their own investments in that machine and their own complicity in its functions.  
 
And what does it mean when you say – “it is lovely as lyric”? And we’ve (you and I) been 
‘brought up’ to be wary of its pull. Lyric as a cheap tart (made with gelatinous cherry 
filling). What is the link between the lyric and nostalgia? One ignites the other. Which 
comes first? Is nostalgia the condition which points to knowing as an emotion of memory? 
Is lyric knowing’s trope. 
 
I also think that – by virtue of the relationship between emotion and cognition, lyric and 
nostalgia – lyric (even if it is problematized) also addresses and thus constructs a 
community of readers, and this address works the ‘author’ in the text. This ‘author’ might 
be mutilated, exposed, ridiculed, parodied, or read as master manipulator of a collective set 
of codes, but even so, it works and creates a relationship with the reader. This relationship 
configures a readerly identification and activity even as (or maybe because) the poem 
problematizes the relationship and renders it complex. Could be that the working of the 
complexity renders the relationship (of reader to text, of reader to ‘author’, of reader to 
reader – lyric forms us as readers so that we must meet ourselves) more fully. 
 
I don’t know Peirce or the Brazilian poets. And I’m not sure about that abdication of 
writer. I’m not sure that it is an interesting way of looking at interesting writing. 
 
T – Yes, I wonder terribly about that. I keep coming back to this notion that if the text is 
unreadable – particularly in the sense that it doesn’t give rise to acts of interpretation, of 
reading, or requires another kind of reading which is not grasping, not interpretive – then, 
in fact it really engenders a passivity in the reader and is not at all fulfilling the claims that, 
as you say, McCaffery makes. So the writer gives up sovereignty only in appearance, as a 
kind of trick that disempowers the reader and reinstates a different kind of authority – one 
that deludes itself. Or maybe both the writer and the reader are disempowered. Or, maybe, 
as I always suspect when writing, the writer is always already the reader. 
 
So I don’t think that his use of the term ‘semiotic’ can be pinned down to any particular 
use within the field of semiotics (la sémiotique) or to Kristeva’s psychoanalytic/linguistic 
semiotic (le sémiotique). I’m tempted, like you, to want to think of it more in terms of le 
sémiotique, or of Barthes’ illisible, materiality of the word, and so on. But I think 
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McCaffery’s working within a range that encompasses the modernism that they are 
addressing, and yet, at the same time, there’s so much more that’s illegitimate rather than 
merely transgressive. You can get a sense of this from the recent anthology he did with Jed 
Rasula (Imagining Language). Or from the extra-literary, or anti-literary practices of his 
sound poetry or his type of concretism. Not “beyond reference,” but “north of intention.” 
Nor “beyond the anxiety of the usual conditions of meaning,” although this is a pretty neat 
formulation. However, I think we are thrown into an anxiety by these texts. Andrew 
[Klobucar] said something like this the other day in a talk at the KSW, something about 
“the anxiety that language poetry usually causes us as readers.” And it’s not the usual 
anxious grasping after meaning, or the anxious pleasure of frustrated (readerly) 
expectations. Or an anxiety caused by the supposed control I’ve been given over the text, 
the reproblematization of power within the text. In many of these texts, my anxiousness is 
not to know the meaning, to decode or interpret – I’m not even tempted to a close reading 
– but to know the structuring principles. 
 
C – So, what is that Modernism? And re: “illegitimate”: McCaffery writes somewhere 
something like: Derrida cannot be right because art must be always wrong. 
 
T – I think that rather than “encompasses the modernism”, I meant to say something more 
like “comprehends”. The modernism that they are addressing seems to be, not the 
historical avant-garde, but that romanticism that came to be called “symbolism” and 
“surrealism”. 
 
C – What does it mean if we need to know the structuring principles? What does it mean if 
we don’t?      
 
T – Yes, I know, I’ve been chastised for this before. But the procedures can’t be deduced 
from the text. Knowing them gives a kind of comfort, but it doesn’t change the way the 
text is read. So perhaps it is akin to trying to force meanings out of the text. On the other 
hand, when I’m told that a description of the method somehow spoils the text, I feel that 
what I’m being told is that it demystifies the text. That is, maybe such readers are clinging 
to the mystery of letters. (Note, your question is about need, not knowledge.) 
 
There’s an aspect of puzzle-making in Seven Pages Missing that runs from the 
mathematical sublime to the “lowest” forms of word-play. 
 
But then, yeah, sometimes I do find myself “beyond the anxiety of the usual conditions of 
meaning.” Reading aloud matters a lot to some of these writings. The second time through 
I started reading aloud right at the selection from “Ow’s Waif” and found, in those pieces, 
a kind of struggling of source texts to out, and it was often in the rhythm, the repetitions. It 
was as if there were something about Newton’s Optics or New York prostitutes that you 
could only know through the filter of these distortions. (I also felt this as a 
misappropriation.) 
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I realize that my earliest attraction was to performance, the hearing of “Lastaworda” or 
“What we Wukkers Want.” The only authentic reading experience I’d had till now was 
“The Black Debt,” which was something I needed at the time, something very strong.  
 
C – What do you mean “authentic reading experience”? 
 
T – Wait, I have to get my etymological dictionary! Maybe I meant an experience in which 
the reader finally does become the author. Not an audition. 
 
But now I’m seeing that, overall, this ‘reading’ is an experience of hearing and seeing – 
not musicality and image, but something else that I’ll try to define. I feel that I haven’t 
really addressed your opening comments sufficiently, as much as I’ve tried to. The last 
paragraphs were thrilling to me – meaning as decay, the materiality of language as the 
signifying process. But I think that they restate Kristeva’s very concept of the semiotic. In 
the context of her development of that concept, thirty years ago, as a theory of poetic 
discourse, your restatement would only differ by being undialectical. That is, you expand 
the semiotic to encompass, or devour, the symbolic. But isn’t that the aspiration of poetic 
discourse? 
 
C – Yes. Exactly. I think so. But in Barthes and Kristeva etc. there is much comfort in 
these oppositions – symbolic, semiotic etc. – which need to be re-fined or re-stated. As far 
as the performative goes, I think that that is where, say, Barthes’ idea about the “death of 
the author” pretty much falls apart. The thing about McCaffery is that he uses Barthes, 
Kristeva, or some kernels of their thinking (death of the author etc.), constantly and, for 
me, often problematically – one, because the ideas are often essentialist; two, because they 
get thrown around like candy. These are ideas that I have soaked in unthinkingly for so 
many years but which have mutated interestingly and are part of the massive poetic 
conversation that goes on. One of the criticisms of McCaffery is that he doesn’t understand 
the theories he cites, ‘uses’. I don’t think so. But, I do think that there is often a huge 
discrepancy between what he says and what he does. Which makes the whole idea of 
knowing someone’s “structuring principles” a problem. But, it also challenges the idea that 
there is only one way to read the stuff. Or that the author is in some kind of control. 
 
T – I guess I didn’t really mean “structuring principles”, I meant procedures. And maybe 
there my curiosity is only to know to what extent the author is removed, is absent, 
absconded. I mean, is he inventing, arranging, or maybe not even that. And now we have 
Lang-Po machines to contend with (GTR’s Workbench). And maybe all that this amounts 
to is a more concerted attempt to shift the author-function to the reader. But, I don’t think 
so, because the reader-function has been so transformed in the process. The other question, 
the “discrepancy between what he says and what he does” also speaks to a shifting of 
function, but within the subject – he says one thing and does another, but maybe he doesn’t 
know what he is doing. Maybe knowledge never knew. I’m thinking this morning, reading 
North of Intention, that each description of another author’s practice is a description of his 
own (how could it be otherwise?). And these descriptions elaborate a range of relationships 
(and non-relationships) between author and text. For example: 
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Mac Low employs  
 
a set of austere principles that emphasize the traditionally negative or 
counter-values in writing: grammatical transgression (even suspension), the 
elimination of a conscious intention, the removal of the writer as a subject 
“responsible” for the texts it “writes”, diminished reference and the absence 
of the subject from the productive aspect of meaning. (222) 
 
Tostevin  
 
gives the processual exterior of a multiple subject in movement [sujet en 
procès] through a register of intensities that situate and circulate upon – but 
are never identical to – meaning. (88) 
 
Bissett’s 
 
corpus [is] a coagulate of forces to be experienced, but not elucidated, 
problematics to be felt but not reconciled. What is called for is an anti-
reading of an anti-text with a forgetfulness in the face of what we do read. 
(92)] 
 
So you’re performing something rather than, or as well as, theorizing it.  
 
I think that Kristeva does provide a theory for what we do. But it makes me uneasy. Partly 
because her writing is so “scientific”, so austere and unpoetic, it gives me the creeps. But I 
do want to talk about this. Especially as it applies to your comment elsewhere about the 
essentialism of écriture féminine. With which I don’t agree, at least if the comment is 
meant to apply to Cixous, say, or Brossard. I first noticed this term (“essentialism”) being 
used by feminists in the 80s to distance themselves from a particularly pernicious strain of 
‘goddess’ talk. But then the brush strokes got broader and were applied to Kristeva and 
Cixous, among others, for reasons I can understand, but don’t think fair. 
 
C – How to talk/write about language in a way that is not based on negation? As I said 
before, I’m not sure that McCaffery’s own articulations of his writing always work. I think 
that they are often caught up in a kind of nostalgia/absence/longing/negation that the work 
itself belies, or dances itself out of, or does as well as. If the metaphysical, via Hegel, 
Heidegger etc., is based on foundation as negation, language as desire, as death and 
absence etc., then I want to walk about with it elsewhere. Which is what I like about 
Spinoza. Agamben suggests that Spinoza’s philosophy is intrinsically positive and that this 
holds it apart from the philosophical discussion of the West that is based in negation. 
Agamben reads Antonio Negri reading Spinoza. Negri argues that Spinoza’s idea of the 
connatus refuses the dialectic. The desire to thrive is intrinsically based on a system of 
relation and interruption that disallows the dialectic. I think I want to move from these 
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binaries: presence, negation, etc. Kristeva is always making a split of things – male/female; 
symbolic/semiotic; body/meaning. And l’écriture féminine which always bothered me with 
its milk metaphors, but maybe, as you say, that isn’t fair and I need to go back to them.  
 
T – To what extent does this “split” coincide with the Hegelian/Marxist dialectic? To what 
extent is Kristeva (like Derrida) working against it, to what extent within? There’s a 
footnote in Semiotiké which always fascinated me. She distinguishes three types of 
“semiotic practice” in relationship to the sign. The third type is 
 
a paragrammatic semiotic practice : the sign is eliminated by the correlative 
paragrammatic sequence that can be represented as a tetralemma : each sign has a 
denotatum; each sign does not have a denotatum; each sign has and does not have a 
denotatum; it is not true that each sign has and does not have a denotatum. (52, “Le 
texte clos”). 
 
C – What the hell does that mean? But I like it—a crazy syllogism. 
 
What about Spinoza? Agamben talks about the Savage Anomaly by Negri re. Spinoza – 
have you read it? One idea here: poetry that involves the body through its pictoriality 
materializes meaning. Or I guess you could say semiotizes meaning. Which is, somewhat, 
what I was trying to get at before. Though there are twinges uncomfortable there. Which 
need thought. But, ah – I end with Barthes on language as death. Easy to say – but not 
resolved. Agamben talks about poetic language exposing the death of the subject in 
language, but revealing the we / the community / the coming community (and, I guess the 
past communities) that is behind all meaning. Which I suppose works in a Wittgensteinian 
way. There is room there and air and the hilarious – and McCaffery is funny. Language as 
consensual – therefore no subject can be singular. All subjects are an articulation of 
consenting (which takes at least two). But then doesn’t that make the foundationless 
foundation only foundationless for the subject as “I”? Doesn’t that mean that the “I” equals 
some kind of common? And this seems much different from simply stating that language is 
death, and the author dead.  
 
And that is another thing I’d like to re-work. The author isn’t dead if language is 
performative. If language is world, gender, human, desire, non-human etc., forming and 
unforming, then the author is more next to it in a configured and linguistic relation. As 
long as we frame language as death, language as desire and desire as the expression of 
longing and therefore absence, even if the words are reassembled, they are still glued with 
such residue. And I can’t make them work when I’m thinking McCaffery’s book. And it’s 
the passivity of nostalgia. But maybe that isn’t right either. Death is not always 
melancholic. Neither is desire. And so not meaning either. Like at a wake, or when giddy 
while grave digging. It’s looking into the abyss of where all of it (meaning etc.) caves in 
and then picks up again. 
 
you sea –  
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    how sweep shines 
    the weeds 
  (146) 
  
 
 
      * * * 
 
 
C – I wrote this following stuff about McCaffery years ago. What was I reading? . . . 
 
A composition on itself. The way of shapes. The schemes of ideas. Knowledge and 
ecstasy. Reading McCaffery. Writing feasting upon an idea as art is writing. 
Writing words as desire:
 
Desire is not a transitive verb. With the subject set in process (jouissance, death) 
we have lost the traditional sense of self, but gained a Text. And Text is a body 
(McCaffery, North of Intention, back-cover); as real: Words are defined as 
components of reality (Weir, “Lecture”); as pictorial: “[W]ords inhabit more a 
pictorial than syntactical space with multi-directional possibilities for reading 
(vertical, diagonal, lineal). Space and placement here, also evoke the narrational, 
interactional suggestion . . .” (McCaffery North of Intention, 35).  
 
By activating the semantic, syntactic, graphemic, and acoustic elements of 
language McCaffery writes the reader transgressive. We are trespassers hazarding 
the farther sides of language & beyond. 
 
Our languages, our shared systems of grammar, reflect, and linguistically enact our 
social systems of control. In the face of these systems poetry can be a resistant 
force. Poetic language can rupture the totalizing force of conventional writing 
forms by challenging, disobeying, and disengaging the figurative and literal hold 
these systems have on us. It can re-form the ways in which we think and see. 
 
 But can language unhinge us from a world institutionalized? Here, I am linking a 
pictoriality with his writing which works towards this unhinging. 
 
For the more and the more he wrote, and the deeper 
and deeper that he dived, Pierre saw the everlasting 
evasiveness of Truth; the universal lurking insincerity 
of even the greatest and purest of thoughts. Like 
knavish cards, the leaves of all great books were 
covertly packed.  
  (Melville, Pierre) 
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[A]nother edge, mobile, blank (ready to assume any 
contours), which is never anything but the site of its 
effect: the place where the death of language is 
glimpsed.  
  (Barthes, Pleasure of the Text?) 
 
[G]rammatical transgressions and non-gravitational stresses, 
might be cited as the verbal counterpart of a non-verbal 
response to reality . . .  
  (McCaffery, North of Intention 34-35) 
Pictoralizing the text. Linking the body’s experience to our words as they inscribe 
us. These texts move against systems of inscription-as-oppression. [The Noh 
Theatre guy on CBC says that clarity is limiting]. Located within space and time, 
McCaffery’s lexical and graphemic re-visions of written histories perform – as 
rebus and retrograde. 
 
[A]ttack language at its point of silence and demand 
speech from it.  
   (McCaffery, North of Intention 36) 
 
Translate or you will be translated (McCaffery). The moment of a word is an 
instance of bifurcation in which the authority of name dispenses into the fluidity of 
object. It is the occurrence of change to something else. 
 
 Le poème hurlait. ( Brossard, Picture Theory 40 ) 
 
      * * * 
 
 
T – Here are some passages from Bernstein’s “Panoptical Artifice” (Open Letter 6:9:87) 
that seem to be in conversation with our exchange. I don’t have time to comment right 
now, but I would like to quarrel with this a little. 
 
Textual features such as “paragrams” must be understood as semantic elements 
that contribute to the “total image complex” of the poem, to use Veronica Forrest-
Thompson’s term. McCaffery can sometimes seem to be saying the reverse: that 
such features undermine the ability of language to mean. In fact, what McCaffery 
is undermining is not meaning but scleroticized (noneroticized) ideas of meaning. 
 
In contrast, McCaffery’s conception of a libidinal energy in writing that can 
“exceed (in the sense of transcend!) the linguistic” is based on the idea, attributed 
to Kristeva and others, that there is a prelinguistic, presymbolic domain that is 
systematically repressed with the acquisition of language: an idea that is the last 
outpost of Romantic ideology in poststructuralist doxa. Rather, the linguistic or 
semantic or symbolic order are coterminous with the body, its coming into being 
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and its expiration. The presymbolic is, at best, a u-topian projection, out of this 
world (like Romanticism’s nonsocial Imagination): literally nowhere, never. 
 
Moreover, the designation of the visual, acoustic, & syntactic elements of a poem 
as “meaningless,” especially insofar as this is conceptualized as positive or 
liberating – & this is a common habit of much current critical discussion of 
syntactically nonstandard poetry – is symptomatic of a desire to evade 
responsibility for meaning’s total, & totalizing, reach; as if meaning was a husk 
that could be shucked off or a burden that could be bucked. Meaning is not a use 
value as opposed to some other kind of value, but more like valuation itself; & 
even to refuse value is a value & a sort of exchange. Meaning is nowhere bound 
to the orbit of purpose, intention, or utility. 
 
. . . the meaning of which I speak is not meaning as we may “know” it, with a 
recuperable intention or purpose. Such a restricted sense of meaning is analogous 
to the restricted senses of knowledge as stipulatively definable . . . As McCaffery 
puts it, “such features of general economic operation do not destroy the order of 
meaning, but complicate & unsettle its constitution and operation.” They destroy, 
that is, not meaning but various utilitarian and essentialist ideas about meaning. 
 
These comments are partly intended as caution against thinking of formally 
active poems, such as McCaffery’s, as eschewing content or meaning – even in 
the face of the difficulty of articulating just what this meaning is. That is, the 
meaning is not absent or deferred but self-embodied as the poem in a way that is 
not transferable to another code or rhetoric. 
  
C – Is being “beyond anxiety” an authentic reading experience? I don’t think I ever read 
this bit by Bernstein. But Bernstein’s second paragraph is exactly what I was getting at 
in regards to Kristeva and Barthes. Except that I don’t think it is the “last outpost of 
Romantic ideology in poststucturalist doxa”. There are others. Actually, I don’t have any 
quarrel with this. I think he’s basically right on. I like what Bernstein means re: 
meaning. Just wonder why McCaffery lets people use the word “meaning” so glibly on 
his book blurb. I’m not sure though about the last sentence – that self-embodied poem-
meaning is not necessarily transferable to another code or rhetoric. Seems to me that part 
of the “responsibility” of language is that it will be transferred (not directly, or 
“correctly”, but still moved – and that that IS its totalizing reach) like it or not.  
 
I’ve been reading Zukofsky and he says this (and I like it as it explains nicely why all 
notions of non-referentiality and post-meaningness aren’t very useful, and it is toward 
what I meant when I wrote that form has meaning and meaning has form (Beckett says 
the same thing in Disjecta): 
 
In poetry the poet is continually encountering the facts which in the making seem 
to want to disturb the music and yet the music or the movement cannot exist 
without the facts, without its facts. (“Prepositions” 18) 
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It [good poetry] is precise information on existence out of which it grows, and 
information of its own existence, that is the movement (and tone) of words.  
(“A Statement for Poetry” 20) 
 
I’d extend the list there with the graphic. 
 
T – I’ve been reading McCaffery pretty intensely and trying to deal with that reading 
experience, mainly. What happens when one reads these texts (and when I say “these 
texts” I mean back to Stein, even). For me it’s not a matter of interpretation, even 
frustrated. The texts don’t slow me down the way Zukofsky does, say, or such. And yet 
there’s a pleasure. I recently read a “close reading” of “Writing Sand Reading” (is that 
what it’s called, in the last section, from The Cheat of Words?) by Perloff (in Sulfur) 
and it seemed very odd to me. 
 
Why? Because the last frontier of such reading is the unconscious, no? And there does 
not seem to be an unconscious at work here. Or, it’s the “semiotic” that’s at work. But 
that must be a version of the unconscious, the real, at least in a pulsional model. 
 
C – I’ve read the Perloff, but long ago.  
 
I guess you could call it unconscious. But not if we think of the semiotic as 
encompassing the symbolic. Then it becomes a conscious kind of unconscious, 
whatever that might be. These terms so troublesome. Needing to be unpacked.  
 
T – But the unconscious does encompass the conscious. 
 
Anyway, how could you have a close reading (interpretation, hermeneutic) of an 
aleatory work? 
 
C – An attended reading? Turning the mind. Or 
 
amor fati 
 
fat love whereby 
 
“one wants nothing to be different, not forward, not backward, not in all 
eternity. Not merely bear what is necessary, still less conceal it  . . . but love it.” 
(Nietzsche) 
 
That's from Ecce Homo, “Why Am I So Clever?" Which I haven't read, but an 
interesting title in the light of stupidity. But Nietzsche says that idealism is 
mendaciousness in the face of the necessary. 
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Amor fati seems pretty idealistic. But maybe not when it comes to poetry. Vico says that 
poetry is the language of necessity. Maybe what you are doing is attending to the 
necessary. If meaning resides inside the box of permanence, then Seven Pages Missing 
is necessary but not because it's post meaning so much as meaning outside the box of 
permanence. 
 
 The mind is then turned outside and into the cold, the cold of poetry (Hejinian). 
 
Maybe the words “close” and “reading” don’t work. What if it’s an attended reading. The 
turning of the mind to be present with, to accompany, or the Latin tendu, stretch. A tendu 
reading. A stretching reading. Then too with “attend” is the sense of time that comes 
from waiting. Extension and durée – Bergson. 
 
T – I’m not saying that this work is simply aleatory – but it does function that way. 
Doesn’t it? 
 
C – Do you mean depending on uncertainty and contingency for significance which then 
must also be a significance of significance’s absence? 
 
T – I guess the kind of interpretation that remains open is functional, or sociological – or 
better, political, even almost pragmatic. 
 
C – I think so. I mean, I think I think so. That is if I have any idea what you are talking 
about. That if it is utterly pragmatic to have the boxes of meaning defined and so 
betrayed. Very functional. The way a chair is. How else can we continue to mean? Is that 
what you mean? 
 
T – The political representations of (“so called”) language poetry, or, more importantly, 
the polemics, the expressed political program, always seemed to me to constitute a 
pragmatics. 
 
C – But then what is A Practical Effect. In Radical Passivity, Thomas Karl Wall writes 
about Levinas writing about poetry as the dead husband on the apartment floor that the 
wife continues to live with. The daily routine unhindered by his corpse – wrapped in a 
rug. In fact, not only unhindered but actually and necessarily facilitated. But poetry as a 
dead husband, wrapped in a rug on the dining room floor for days and then weeks means 
that the idea of pragmatism has to be re-said. 
 
T – I’m left feeling stupid before the fact. I feel like I asked and answered these questions 
twenty-five years ago. The eternal return.  
 
C – Sometimes I find that I have answered these questions – in old notebooks – but forget 
or shift and then have to start all over again and so answer them, or not, endlessly. Which 
is something that Hejinian says about writing the same thing all your life. Which is 
entirely different from writing what you know. 
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T – Yes. 
 
I agree with you that what we have to deal with is the question of meaning and its status 
in this work. This kind of work, this métier. I’ve also really wanted, for a long time, to 
work out the differences between Lisa, say, and Jeff [Derksen], say, to take two iconic 
examples (I mean their writing of course), in the larger context of metaphor and 
metonymy (I mean those concepts in their structuralist and post-structuralist inflation – 
this is shorthand, here). This was to be a counter-attack on the Klobucar/Barnholden intro 
to Writing Class. 
 
C – Yes, I wonder how many there are out there. Very interesting. Really crucial for me 
now. I’ve been thinking a lot about how Lisa and Catriona [Strang] differ. Spending a 
great deal of time with Low Fancy. But Jeff. So much that waits to be articulated. Is that 
what you mean by unconscious? Is the unconscious all that which awaits articulation? 
Whatever it is presents itself like an ache. Does the unconscious hurt? 
 
T – Nope, I’m orthodox in this regard. The unconscious is structured like a language, but 
nothing in the unconscious can ever be articulated. In fact, nothing in the unconscious can 
ever become conscious. 
 
Here’s something I wrote last week. I feel particularly stupid about the bit on the 
unconscious – but then maybe I just said it better above, with less effort. 
 
Negation misses the positivity of sundials. I woke up dreaming, the other day, that 
there can be no hermeneutics of this writing. That seemed quite profound to me, 
in the momentary way that a kif thought does, or like the pleasure of the poetic 
word, fading. That first sentence, above. I remained under an imperative to write 
out the thoughts I’d woken with, but could never find a moment with a note pad. 
And now it’s almost too late. 
 
But look, “the positivity of sundials” admits interpretation, because it’s a 
symptom, at the very least. And the unconscious operates according to a logic, a 
rhetoric and a grammar. Erasing the subject also erases the unconscious. So 
there’s no way back to intention, or even unintention. There often isn’t even an 
effect of meaning. Maybe that’s because the writing is so entirely metonymic. 
Metonyms generate other words, part words, not other thoughts. 
 
No polyvalence, no polyguity. Just this discordant music of word objects. No 
accumulation, no capital. “2. two. too. to. 2wo.” (155) Alliteration, alteration, 
aeration, ratio, to. 
 
C – You say “metonyms generate other words not other thoughts.” But what is language, 
what are words, but thinking? Maybe there has to be another word for it. When I read  “2. 
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two. too. to. 2wo.” it generates thoughts, thinking, meaning accumulates making 
associations – more metonyms. Metonyms are thoughts? Aren’t they. I mean, I KNOW 
what you mean. But. 
 
T – Try again? 
 
The notion of fragment privileges the ontic, and my interest in this work is 
kinetic, more specifically the subjection of the instance of meaning to dynamic 
forces, in which syntax gets reconfigured as a passage through transitory semantic 
assemblages in a constant becoming . . . I try to apply this [Deleuze and Guattari’s 
concept] to a notion of “becoming meaning,” a movement that is constantly and 
simultaneously thwarted and promoted.  
     (McCaffery, in Philly Talks 17) 
 
Maybe this is what I wanted to say. 
 
C – According to Judith Butler this is how ALL language works all the time – no matter 
how it is presented. Every instance of language is this moment of constant becoming in 
which movement is constantly and simultaneously thwarted and promoted. This, 
according to Butler, is the only way that meaning can occur. (See Excitable Speech and 
Bodies that Matter.) 
 
So, say within Butler’s idea of language and how it means, you could say that McCaffery 
is accelerating an already activated process. Making plain what most writing systems 
work to hide.  
 
 
 
 
      * * * 
 
 
T – We need to talk about the gnomic bits. 
 
consider the page not as a space but as a death occurring in 
the gap between 
’writing’ and ‘wanting to say’ 
  (208) 
 
meanings are what we alter 
truths what we displace 
 (212) 
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C – These are the fortune cookie bits. They are very intentional. Very meant to mean.  Or 
else undo themselves with their excess of pith. Something you’d stamp on t-shirt. 
 
T – There’s more. 
 
provide the context and the content will always happen 
     (224) 
 
 that general pestilence called meaning 
   (238) 
 
 first define good writing as a form of bad reading 
 then earn the right to write 
  (230) 
 
 never read 
 never write 
 always continue to learn 
  (232) 
 
  C – But they are funny. 
 
the steel wheel “rolls” but 
a wheel made of butter goes 
on rolls                         
  (151) 
 
 
T – Again, see Sulfur, Perloff’s close reading of “Writing Sand Reading” 
 
 and 
 
But it is not our wish to reproduce 
            ourselves through you 
  the reader, 
nor to reassure you that these words are true 
or where the line breaks          there is a meaning 
stabilized          by that news 
speech is                       assuring you 
our plans are still the same 
as when we met original in formal theory 
by the fridge on the streetcar 
 beneath some baggage of your satisfactions. 
 
       (The Cheat of Words, 105) 
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Reading aloud from “Organized Happiness,” realized the continuity of his project, made 
visible in this white tomb. Requires proper diction and an English tone. 
 
Or is it just hearing his voice, as one hears Joyce, mimes Joyce, when reading Finnegan’s 
Wake, aloud? 
 
C – What about writing as thanotopractic (451): writing as an economy of death and 
absence. The writer becomes dead to the work on completion. When I read him reading 
himself in my head he gets in the way. 
 
T – But there’s a particular prosody and structured syntax, of the 17th Century, from 
“Newton’s Optics” to “Teachable Texts”. Take this, for instance, and count: 
 
Belief thus blocks behind 
generic’s relative ambitions 
still specific to this weather’s heat 
 but writ from evidence 
attractive to the terms we lay 
upon   aspersions of preferment. 
       (398) 
 
There’s number, but no argument here. It’s antithetic. But there is a grammar. One could 
interpolate “meaningful” words – “Belief thus bides behind / the prince’s relative 
ambition,” etc. But one can’t draw the words down from the surface into a coherence, one 
or more layers of meaning. Joyce’s text does insist upon interpretation, can be misread. 
McCaffery seems to say that once intention is removed – if that’s possible outside of pure 
chance procedures – then there can be no misreadings. Or at least he says that some of the 
time – see 202, “A Short Cup Poem.” Or see North of Intention, 45, fn. 3, where he 
interprets Michael Palmer’s lines “After waking he / waited” as descriptive of post-
funeral servitude. This “interpretation” is offered to demonstrate the indeterminacy of the 
sentence. But surely there are things he would not want his sentences to be seen as 
saying?  
 
C – I’m not sure. I think it depends on the piece. The text is at times even instructive. For 
example, the stuff from “Knowledge Never Knew.” Instructive. Words to live by. Write 
by. Much of the time it’s a story about the unmeaning of meaning, the shifting 
nothingness of the subject. Often it is very meaningful and purposeful. Is that the same 
thing? 
 
T – He has several models of reading. Another one is articulated in his piece on Bissett 
where he posits an “anti-reading that would affirm a motion, not comprehend a sense.” 
He also calls this an “affirmative reading” (North of Intention 102-103). 
 
C – Yes, affirming a motion. That’s nice. Every way oakly. Poetry as ride. 
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T – I think this is what I was trying to say earlier when I spoke of a reading that’s not 
slowed by the text, that remains on the surface, or what you were pointing to still earlier 
when you called upon Barthes’ “pleasure of the text.” It also seems to me that the often 
invoked “materiality of the text,” as it’s played out in object writing, phenomenological 
writing, from Stein to Ponge to McCaffery, insists upon a surface reading, along a plane, 
or drawn through knots, or across plateaux, or constantly driven back to a surface from 
folds (see Deleuze, Du Sens). 
 
C – Transforming comprehension into perception (443). The focus on seeing also works 
with your not-slowed surface reading. Reading as seeing. He’s big on that. So it is anti-
immersional (see “Storax” 318). That way you can experience the perception. Perceive 
the perception. Percept not concept. This is Vico. And Lisa. Surfaces. Perceive meaning’s 
capricious bent. Like intimate distortions, “the scene seen” (138). 
 
            a new criterion for jocular deviance 
    (422) 
 
But perception is better than comprehension? Surface verses depth. What is the 
difference? Is one more clear. Less cluttered. Though a surface can get very cluttered. 
And off topic somewhat, why do we privilege awareness? Another fetish. I wonder about 
that. 
 
Re: McCaffery and word as mud. (There is Levinas in here too: the obscurity of love.) 
Isn’t perception comprehension and representation constructive, performative? And 
reference too. How else could it be? Doesn’t this book illustrate that? Everywhere 
McCaffery goes language is already there or it takes him. Takes him to note the turns but 
I don’t think this book is beyond the usual conditions of meaning, it’s more like an acute 
inhabitation of. 
 
“What I did was set up the sufficient conditions for any open field to form into 
which a word could find its own way settling into its own syntactic space and 
thereby determining the meaning of that space.” (442) 
 
He writes that re: “Dr. Sandhu’s Muffins” (which I love), and this too: 
 
present[ing] language-material without the intrusion of my own consciousness 
. . . to write poems that were mutually revelatory to both reader and writer . . . 
the accurate transcription of a pure perceptual process of the writer functioning 
as reader . . . the poems became transcriptions of the movement of the moment 
of actual observation. (442) 
 
T – Perhaps one way to approach this (the question of models of reading – as a way of 
getting at that other question of interpretation, or the nature of meaning) would be to take 
the selection from “Knowledge Never Knew,” halfway through Seven Pages Missing 
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(perhaps one of the missing “pages” is actually the waiter in Palmer’s poem – see above), 
as a guide. 
 
C – That is an interesting post-meaning or even surface reading idea – a guide. And it is 
guide-like: “to write is to reach a surface through the holes named things” (205). How 
does that work with thanopractic writing? A dead guide? Yep, that works if you think of 
Wall and the dead husband on the rug and the wife that leaves him there because his 
presence lets her mark the movement of her day. That works. 
 
T – Well, I was going to try to do this at this point, use the gnomics of “Knowledge 
Never Knew” as a guide – and actually I think it would provide a good pivot for the 
whole thing we’re working on here – but later, later – and then I want to say something 
about the political, along the lines of the following. 
 
When I spoke of pragmatics earlier, I was thinking about the political claims of this 
writing. These claims have to do entirely with practice (with pragmatics), again on 
various models: semanalytic, schizanalytic, a general economy, a libidinal economy, etc. 
The act of writing, and equally the act of reading (“never read / never write / always 
continue to learn,” 232) as itself a political practice . . . (here compelled to re-read Rossi-
Landi’s “Il linguaggio come lavoro e come mercato” but found after twenty pages or so 
that this was more than I could encompass in the space of a whim) . . . 
 
C – Maybe you should try Rossi-Landi in English? I read him years ago via Silliman. 
Sentence as tool. Nice.  
 
T – Just realized in cold walk to coffee shop that the enactment of the political at the level 
of the word, or rather, simply, within language (from distinctive features to discourse), or 
let’s say within poetic practice, works always by analogy to actual political practice 
(action), or just maybe is a form of such practice – it’s a stretch, but this can be argued – 
AND is also somehow always in dialectical relation to that earlier, romantic and post-
romantic, sense of the word as revolutionary, in which the word, a poetic, operates in 
relation to spirit – i.e. objectivism (language poetry) is a reversal of, or better still works 
within the gambit of, symbolism, just as our socialisms, our communism, works within 
the structures of the spiritual, the utopian – or to be Derridean, the traces of metaphysics 
(still trying to read Rossi-Landi last night – he doesn’t say any of this, but maybe 
prompted these thoughts – want to work this line a little . . .)  
 
ambit not gambit 
 
C – I looked up gambit in my very small 1959 Oxford:  noun. “a chess term” “an opening 
with sacrifice of piece”. It’s some kind of conversation. With big gaps. In time and in 
direction. I don’t think a gambit can be dialectical. 
 
But it doesn’t matter. What else would be better? Though sometimes. I can’t always 
figure out what the hell you are talking about. Which works. Words are mud, as obscure 
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as love. This is Levinas’ idea that the subject exists in a relation that is non-appropriative. 
Alterity is not subsumed, difference is left intact. It must be. We are always other to each 
other, to ourselves. 
 
Re: “an enactment of politics” – do you mean that because societal power relations are 
present in our language structures, a poetic practice that seeks to expose, undermine, 
rearrange these relations (never read/ never write/ always continue to learn) is analogous 
to, or a form of actual political activism – strikes, armed resistance, demonstrations – and 
that this analogy works both within and without the romantic ideal of the word as 
revolutionary? That is, without because the focus is not on the transcendent spiritual 
value of the word, but on an active practice of language within which the authority of the 
writer is displaced – not rendered to the winds of an Edmund Burkian sublime, but given 
over to a reader and his or her relationship with the text – so that meaning is in an active, 
actual and consensual activity. But within, because we cannot ever fully escape the 
barbed wire of western metaphysics? 
 
When you say spirit do you mean transcendent? 
 
When you say romantic do you mean Percy Bysshe? 
 
I don’t think I’d say that it is analogous to, but maybe a form of.  It is something. To 
wrestle the smug laurels off meaning is something.  
 
But it leads to depression, nudity, piles, curvature of the spine, indecision and 
embarrassment. 
 
Spent much of yesterday with Seven Pages Missing. Last night too. Some of it so so 
fucking absolutely amazing. Then some not so. Or not not so but suffocating. Read  his 
“explanations” at the back. Similar problem here though. What does it mean to “discard 
description” (440) or why is viewing language as “pure, graphic materiality” a 
“defetishizing strategy” (440)? I mean, I think I know what he means, but how can we 
stay there? And why would we? After Stein – Tender Buttons, Stanzas in Meditation etc. 
Why should “description” lie wrapped in that nasty old sheet despite all its un-wrappings. 
Where is the “political” here if we don’t actually change the way we word? And it seems 
that McCaffery’s “pure graphic materiality” is fetishizing. I think some of his ideas are 
Romantic, problematic. Where is the practice in pure? Plus I want to turn and retrieve the 
fetish. Why shouldn’t rubber boots be an object of sexual affection? Is it even possible 
not to fetishize? But maybe this makes all discussion impossible. But maybe it’s just the 
tendu of an attendent reading. The turning. His own criticism of Broken Mandela is its 
“failure to move this clash of linguistic dispositions (material sign on the one hand and 
idealist referentiality on the other) beyond staged representation and into an effective 
form of immanent critique. So, the work remains theatrical and on that account still of a 
representational nature” (440). I’d argue that theatricality necessarily disrupts the nature 
of representability. But I think what he means is that it’s not much of a gambit. Not many 
openings there. And that is true I think. It still needs words. Still, I like them. I also like 
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the typesetting. I like how it graphemes the text, especially in places like the gorgeous 
redwood suite. 
 
  
      * * * 
 
CODA 
 
C – I’m a little Anti Coleridge these days. Samuel is always on about how the world of 
phenomena is mere husk and must entirely disappear so that formal laws alone remain. 
Blah blah. Stab out the eyes if you want to really see. Blah blah. Sort of deal. But his 
poetry is nice: Demon lovers etc. 
 
Here is what Longinus says – another anti material sort: 
 
Evil are the swellings both in the body and in diction. 
 
What was it? Were they all just pissed off cause the material looks like it’s really there – 
swelling and such, but doesn’t pan out? That is what is so great about Vico and maybe 
what I like about McCaffery too. Meaning erupts of this extreme crash of stupid humans 
with raw world matter and so the stupid humans make up stories about the raw matter 
that reminds the stupid humans of themselves (origin as recognition). Thus science, 
knowledge, philosophy, abstract thought, meaning, and the world are nothing but the 
enormous energy of absolute ignorance, stuff and collision. And Vico says that that is 
sublime.  
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